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World Premiere of 'A Whisper to a Roar'

<p>&lt;iframe width="420" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/T69mA9VRpRM" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;</p>
<p>Clip from <a target="_blank" title="Prince Moulay Hicham Remarks Clip from Premiere" href="http://youtu.be/T69mA9VRpRM">Prince Moulay Hicham’s Opening Remarks</a> at the World Premiere of “A Whisper to a Roar” at the Directors’ Guild Theatre in Los Angeles on October 3, 2012, where he speaks to “the conflict between human nature and the human spirit.”</p>
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Transition in Tunisia - Towards a New Citizenship

The concept of citizenship, beyond the mere legal character, is becoming the social dynamic driving individuals to participate in the construction of a democratic society. No one-is able to predict what model of citizenship the current transformations in Arab countries will lead to. In the Arab world the question of citizenship is an ongoing and endless debate. Because it is linked to rights, the modern concept of citizenship has been framed within a legal character. Regimes considered the implementation of a strong State a priority, beyond other considerations. Civic duties related to individual freedoms, were either ignored or trampled or repressed.
It is now widely recognized that separating freedoms, economic development and citizenship from democracy is quite impossible. Historically, citizenship in western countries is the result of different confrontations and agreements according to groups, people or times. Today, contestation of established regimes assists in emergence of a new generation that does not negotiate its citizenship, but rather assumes it with all its complexity and diversity. In this regard, Tunisia is one of the countries where the redefinition of the State’s  role and the citizen’s  place is being negotiated. After the Constituent Assembly was elected and the provisional government took office dominated by Ennahda Islamists, the ongoing democratic transition helped to clarify the political reality of the country, There are numerous and significant expectations, particularly in the areas of justice, morality of the public life and changes in political practices. The judicial institution is at the heart of all the debates.
Here again, transition will be slow and protracted. Nevertheless, large segments of the population are impatient. How is the government coalition facing the popular contestation? What is the legitimacy of the political parties? How does avoiding challenge not to translate into mistrust? Tunisians have decided to renegotiate their social contract and redefine their citizenship. These processes cannot be concluded swiftly. While its institutions are being widely questioned, the State needs to restore its legitimacy and rehabilitate itself With debates on identity and the search for ideological references, economic urgency and international identity, Tunisia has become the laboratory of a rising Arab democracy.

September 4-5, 2012 - Tunis
<p>&lt;iframe src="http://player.vimeo.com/video/48797069?title=0&amp;amp;byline=0" width="400" height="225" frameborder="0" webkitAllowFullScreen mozallowfullscreen allowFullScreen&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;</p>
<p><span style="text-align: justify;">The concept of citizenship, beyond the mere legal character, is becoming the social dynamic driving individuals to participate in the construction of a democratic society. No one-is able to predict what model of citizenship the current transformations in Arab countries will lead to. In the Arab world the question of citizenship is an ongoing and endless debate. Because it is linked to rights, the modern concept of citizenship has been framed within a legal character</span></p>
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Radicalisation and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring changed the pattern of Islamic radicalisation in the region. The new Arab revolutions advocated new values, rooted in peaceful secularised Islamic notions that were in deep opposition to the Jihadist cultural values, like the dignity of the citizen and peaceful political mobilisation.
Before the downfall of the Tunisian and Egyptian autocracies, the Jihadist[1] trend within Muslim land was already on the decline. In many countries repression against Islamic radicals, but also the utter violence of the Jihadists and their lack of any constructive project for their host societies brought down their prestige. Their attacks against tourists and Muslims in Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere made them unpopular among many Muslims.
To read the full article:

By Farhad Khosrokhavar - Radicalisation Research - 23rd of April 2012
<p>The Arab Spring changed the pattern of Islamic radicalisation in the region. The new Arab revolutions advocated new values, rooted in peaceful secularised Islamic notions that were in deep opposition to the Jihadist cultural values, like the dignity of the citizen and peaceful political mobilisation.</p>
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Professor, prince

Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah M.A. ’97 walked into the CoHo, glanced around, smiled and said, “Well, this is a cozy place.”
Wearing jeans and plain black sweater, he blended into the crowd of Stanford students and visitors, none of whom knew they were in the presence of a prince.
Being a prince “can be more of a nuisance than anything else. People scrutinize you and have preconceived notions like…does he wear a turban?” he joked.
Ben Abdallah, whose full name is Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui, is third in line to the throne of the Kingdom of Morocco and first cousin to the current King, Mohammed VI. Nicknamed the “Red Prince,” he is well known for favoring democratic reforms in Morocco and the Arab world. He does not, however, appreciate the title, stating in an interview with the French journal Le Debat that it was given to him by the same “information handlers” who nicknamed King Mohammed VI “King of the Poor.”
His unorthodox views in the conservative kingdom led to his expulsion from palace grounds by his cousin, who ascended the throne in 1999 after the death of his father and Ben Abdallah’s uncle, Hassan II.
Morocco’s Al-Alaoui dynasty has been in power for four centuries and traces its lineage back to the Prophet Mohammed. The monarchy does not tolerate criticism.
“The authorities use the restrictive press law and an array of financial and other, more subtle mechanisms to punish critical journalists, particularly those who focus on the king, his family or Islam,” states the Freedom House 2011 Country Report on Morocco.
“The monarchy is a cultural and historical symbol,” Ben Abdallah said. “This is why Moroccans are aware of its crucial role in society and push for reform instead of overthrowing the regime…but there is a deep sense of frustration and impatience.”
His decision to publicly state his controversial views in 1995 was not taken lightly.
“I thought profoundly about who I was and what my country was,” he said. “It was not easy. There were high costs, and one of them was being ostracized and even vilified.”
Nevertheless, Ben Abdallah remains an outspoken political maverick, unwavering in his support for controversial publications and journalists as well as groups like the February 20th Youth Movement.
Raised in the Moroccan capital Rabat’s Royal Palace complex, Ben Abdallah attended the Rabat American School and graduated from Princeton with a bachelor’s degree in politics in 1985. After pursuing several entrepreneurial and humanitarian endeavors, he came to Stanford in 1995 to pursue a master’s degree in political science.
“Deepening my experience and my knowledge one way or another has never been interrupted in my life no matter where I go,” Ben Abdallah said.
In his witty, yet diplomatic, manner, Ben Abdallah compared Stanford and Princeton.
“Princeton is like an orchestra where you cannot play out of note but produce great music,” he said. “Stanford is like one big rock band where everyone is encouraged to make their own sound.”
After leaving the Farm, Ben Abdallah stayed in close contact with Larry Diamond, director of the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).
In 2007, Ben Abdallah left his home in Princeton, where he had been living since 2002, and returned to Stanford as a CDDRL visiting scholar.
At CDDRL, he has been deeply involved in the Arab Reform and Democracy Program doing research, mentoring students, giving talks and developing the program.
“My goal is to enrich myself and my community as well as foster general understanding of the region,” he said.
Although Ben Abdallah originally intended to stay at CDDRL for two years, he eventually decided to remain longer and is now a consulting professor. This means he regularly commutes back to Princeton, where his wife, Malika, and their two daughters live.
One of Ben Abdallah’s initial research projects at CDDRL was investigating the idea that the Arab world is incompatible with democracy, which he swiftly rejected as a false concept.
“There was an underlying thesis that there was something about Arabs that makes them accept authoritarianism, and I wanted to unbundle it,” he said. “I wanted to say, look, authoritarianism is here, but this is why it’s here. The factors are not cultural.”
The Arab Spring may have surprised the Western world, but not Ben Abdallah.
“I always felt that something was around the corner,” he said. “I knew that the status quo was untenable, and that in a few of these places something would have to give way.”
What surprised him was the movement’s place of origin, Tunisia, which had a strong security apparatus. He also did not envision the movement’s diffusion and transformation into what he called an “awakening.”
Despite the optimism in the movement, he said that the future of the region is uncertain. Setbacks, reversals and failures are all likely to happen as each country faces its own particular demons, he said, but he believes the trend towards democracy is irreversible.
“This is a new generation with new values,” he said. “Fear has receded, and societies will not remain idle.”
He also downplayed fears over the rise of Islamist parties throughout the region and in his native Morocco, where the Justice and Development Party, a moderate Islamist party, recently won parliamentary elections.
“This does not mean we will see the rise of theocracies,” he said. “People are not going to resist secular authoritarianism to fall into religious despotism.”
Although Ben Abdallah has vigorously championed reform in Morocco for the last two decades, he attempts to keep his expectations realistic.
“It took hundreds of years for the West to get things on track,” he said. “It will be a messy and laborious process for Morocco, but we’ll eventually get it right.”
Ben Abdallah’s work at Stanford and in politics is not the end of his pursuits. He also runs his own foundation, the Moulay Hicham Foundation for Social Science Research on North Africa and the Middle East, founded Princeton’s Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia and owns Al-Tayyar Energy, a renewable energy company that processes agricultural waste in Thailand.
“I barely have free time; I am juggling,” he said. “Every time I think I cannot handle more, someone else throws me another ball to juggle.”
Although his professional and family lives are rooted in the United States now, Ben Abdallah still keeps close ties with Morocco and returns often.
“I miss the community feel,” he said. “I miss my nephews and my friends. I miss walking on the streets hearing the call to prayer and smelling the odors of spices, so now and then I need to go back home.”

By Natasha Weaser - Stanford Daily - 11th of January 2012
<p>Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah M.A. ’97 walked into the CoHo, glanced around, smiled and said, “Well, this is a cozy place.” Wearing jeans and plain black sweater, he blended into the crowd of Stanford students and visitors, none of whom knew they were in the presence of a prince.</p>
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Audience Questions to Moroccan Prince

The Arab Spring came under scrutiny Monday night as 100 students, faculty and community members gathered in Linsly-Chittenden Hall to hear a prince of Morocco speak about developments in the Middle East. At the talk, which the Arab Students’ Association has been working for over a year to organize, Prince Moulay Hicham ben Abdallah el-Alaoui discussed the causes of the Arab Spring and his predictions for nations that have experienced revolutions in recent months.
After the talk, he took questions from audience members, many of whom were eager to question his views. Ben Abdallah el-Alaoui said outcomes of the Arab Spring will include successes, failures and perceived successes in which power will actually fall back into the hands of the regimes that were initially overthrown.
“Tunisia seems like it’s in the most promising phase for democracy,” he said, adding that Egypt is in a state of incomplete transition, while Libya faces the greatestchallenges in democratizationbecause of the previous regime’s totalitarianism. Though many have emphasized the importance of social technology like Facebook and Twitter in enabling people to mobilize during the Arab Spring, ben Abdallah el-Alaoui said the role of social technology should not be exaggerated. Many regimes have had the power to blackout “liberation technology,” he said. The true power behind the uprisingslies inthe capacity of citizens to mobilize onthe ground, he added. The largest demographic leading the protests and rebellions over the last year has been the “new young generation,” ben Abdallah el-Alaoui said, which is motivated by disillusionment with regimes that have tried to overstay their welcome. He added that all monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa will eventually face calls fordemocratic change, though they may be able to buy time before this happenswith monetary incentives or cultural symbolism.
During the question-and-answer period, a member of the audience compared the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to those in the Arab Spring — a comparisonben Abdallah el-Alaouirejected as invalid because the regime changes in those countries did not come from“within the fabrics of society” but rather from external interventions.
“[Iraq and Afghanistan] are a totally different animal,” he said. “We need to be conscious of outside intervention. With outside intervention you lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people.” Three audience members said they wished ben Abdallah el-Alaouihad discussed Morocco’s current political state more during the talk. Khadija El-Hazimy, a staff member at Sterling Memorial Library who lived in Morocco until the age of 13, said she identified with ben Abdallah el-Alaoui’s perspective.
Still, she said he should have talked more about current issues in Morrocco, such as new youth organizations. Ben Abdallah el-Alaoui attended Princeton for his undergraduate years and Stanford for graduate school.

By Liz Rodriguez-Florido - Yale Daily News - 11th of October 2011
<p>The Arab Spring came under scrutiny Monday night as 100 students, faculty and community members gathered in Linsly-Chittenden Hall to hear a prince of Morocco speak about developments in the Middle East.</p>

The paradoxes of the re-Islamization of Muslim societies

This essay is one of nearly three dozen original contributions included in 10 Years After September 11, a digital collection launched today by the Social Science Research Council. In the days immediately following 9/11/01, the SSRC invited a wide range of leading social scientists to write short essays for an online forum.  Ten years later, these same contributors have been asked to reflect on what has changed and what remains the same. The result is an extraordinary collection of new essays, with contributions from Rajeev Bhargava, Mary Kaldor, Barbara D. Metcalf, Saskia Sassen, Veena Das, Richard Falk, and many others.—ed.
The 9/11 debate was centered on a single issue: Islam. Osama Bin Laden was taken at his own words by the West: Al-Qaeda, even if its methods were supposedly not approved by most Muslims, was seen as the vanguard or at least a symptom of “Muslim wrath” against the West, fueled by the fate of the Palestinians and by Western encroachments in the Middle East; and if this wrath, which has pervaded the contemporary history of the Middle East, has been cast in Islamic terms, it is because Islam is allegedly the main, if not the only, reference that has shaped Muslim minds and societies since the Prophet.
This vertical genealogy obscured all the transversal connections (the fact, for instance, that Al-Qaeda systematized a concept of terrorism that was first developed by the Western European ultra-left of the seventies or the fact that most Al-Qaeda terrorists do not come from traditional Muslim societies but are recruited from among global, uprooted youth, with a huge proportion of converts).
The consequence was that the struggle against terrorism was systematically associated with a religious perspective based on the theory of a clash of civilizations: Islam was at the core of Middle East politics, culture, and identity. This led to two possibilities: either acknowledge the “clash of civilizations” and head toward a global confrontation between the West and Islam or try to mend fences through a “dialogue of civilizations,” enhancing multiculturalism and religious pluralism. Both attitudes shared the same premises: Islam is both a religion and a culture and is at the core of the Arab identity. They differed on one essential point: for the “clashists,” there is no “moderate” Islam; for the “dialogists,” one should favor and support “moderate” Islam, with the recurring question, what is a good Muslim?
Then came, just ten years after 9/11, the Arab Spring, in which Islam did not play a role, and the killing of Osama Bin Laden, whose death went almost unnoticed among Muslim public opinion. What about the “Muslim wrath”? Suddenly, the issue of Islam and jihad being at the core of the political mobilization in Muslim societies seemed to become, at least for a time, irrelevant. So what went wrong with the perception of the Western media, leaders, and public opinion? Was the West wrong about the role of Islam in shaping political mobilization in Muslim societies? Yes. The essentialist and culturalist approach, common to both the clash of and dialogue of civilizations theories, missed three elements: society, politics, and more astonishingly . . . religion.
In fact, three paradigms—social, political, and religious—have changed in Muslim societies over the last twenty years:
A new global generation — As Philippe Fargues showed some time ago, there has been a profound demographic change in the Arab world: the fertility rate has fallen dramatically (in Tunisia, it fell below the French rate after 2000), women have entered universities and the job market, young people marry later, there is more equality in couples (in terms of age and education), they have fewer children and are better educated than their parents, and nuclear families are replacing extended households. Cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet have allowed these new generations to connect and debate on a “peer” basis rather than through a top-down authoritarian system of knowledge transmission. The younger generation is a peer generation and does not want to be strongly bound to a patriarchal society that has been unable to cope with the challenges of contemporary Middle Eastern societies.
A shift in the political culture — Being more individualistic, the members of this new generation are less attracted to holistic ideologies, whether Islamist or nationalist, and there is a sharp decline of interest in the patriarchal model embodied by charismatic leaders. The failure of political Islam that I pointed to twenty years ago is obvious; it does not mean that Islamist parties are no longer present on the political field—to the contrary—but that their Utopian conception of an “Islamic state” has lost credibility. The Islamist ideology is challenged either by a call for democracy, which rejects the claim of any party or ideology to have a monopoly on power, or by the “neo-fundamentalists,” or Salafis, who claim that only a strict personal return to the true tenets of religious practices could help to establish an “Islamic society.” Even among the Muslim Brotherhood, young members reject blind obedience to the leadership. The new generation calls for debate, freedom, democracy, and good governance. They are more patriotic than nationalist, and while the Palestinian issue still has an emotional impact, it is no longer at the core of political mobilization (a fact, by the way, that undermines the well-established cliché stating that, as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unsettled, there will be no peace or democracy in the Middle East). The appeal of democracy is not a consequence of the exportation of the concept of Western democracy, as fancied by the supporters of the US military intervention in Iraq. It is the political consequence of a process of social and cultural changes in Arab societies, which, of course, is part of the globalization process. It is precisely because the Arab Spring is a succession of indigenous upheavals, centered on the nation and unlinked from Western encroachments (which, when they happen, come after and not before the movement, as in Libya), that democracy is seen as both acceptable and desirable. Consequently, the ritual anti-imperialist mottos and chants have disappeared from demonstrations (including the usual condemnation of Zionism as the source of all the problems of the Arab world). This explains why Al-Qaeda is out of the picture: the uprooted global jihadist is no longer a model and fails to germinate when he comes to enlist local militants for the global cause (Al-Qaeda has been expelled from Iraq by the local fighters), with the exception of the geographic fringes of the Arab world (Sahel, Somalia, Yemen). Al-Qaeda was part and parcel of the old anti-imperialist Middle East political culture: fighting the West first and never caring about real societies. It disappears with the dictators because they are two sides of the same coin.
A new religiosity — This is probably the least understood mutation. There were two recurrent premises underlying the debate on Islam: that democratization is linked with secularization and that this secularization process should go with a rise of a “liberal Islam.” So began the search for reformers, liberals, not to speak of a Muslim Martin Luther (the people who advocate a reformation of Islam in order to free it from fundamentalism, anti-Semitism, and gender prejudices apparently never read Luther). The visible re-Islamization of Muslim societies during the last thirty years (spreading of the veil, growing mosque attendance, Islamization of daily life, and so forth) seemed at odds with this supposed prerequisite, but in fact, it is far more congruent with a process of democratization than expected. Why? This wave of re-Islamization hides a very important fact: it has contributed to the diversification and the individualization of the religious field. Religion (theological corpus) did not change, but religiosity (the way the believer experiences his or her faith) did, and this new religiosity, liberal or not, is compatible with democratization because it unlinks personal faith from collective identity, traditions, and external authority. The usual religious authorities (ulema, or Islamist leaders) have largely lost their legitimacy in favor of self-appointed, and often self-taught, religious entrepreneurs. Young born-agains have found their own way by surfing on the Internet or joining local groups of peers: very critical of the cultural Islam of their parents, they have tried to construct their own brand of Islam. Religion has become more and more a matter of personal choice, ranging from Salafism to any sort of syncretism, not to mention conversions to other religions (see, for instance, the growth of an evangelical Protestant church among former Muslims in Morocco and Algeria). This individualization and diversification has had the unexpected consequence of disconnecting religion from daily politics, of bringing it back to the private, and of excluding it from the sphere of government management. As I tried to show in Holy Ignorance, fundamentalism, by disconnecting religion from culture and by defining a faith community through believing and not just belonging, is in fact contributing to the secularization of society (hence the bitter belief of any fundamentalist, from born-again Christian evangelicals to Salafi Muslims, that true believers are a minority, even if the surrounding society is nominally sharing the same religion).
All these changes gave way to what I called “post-Islamism” (the expression was first used by Asef Bayat)—it does not mean that the Islamists disappeared, but that their Utopia did not block social, political, or even geo-strategic realities. They have no blueprint for an “Islamic economy,” and although they run many charities in deprived neighborhoods, they tend to become socially conservative, opposing strikes and approving of the rescinding of agrarian reform in Egypt; they have never been able to articulate a coherent supranational program of mobilizing the “ummah” (the Islamic world), leaving the concept in the bloody hands of Al-Qaeda and standing in the Middle East in an uneasy status quo between the strategic ambitions of a supposedly Islamic, but Shia, Iran and Arab dictators (from Saddam Hussein to the Saudis) who claim to protect the Sunnis from the “Shia threat.” They favor elections because they do not support armed struggle even when unable to strike a deal with authoritarian regimes, but they are uneasy about sharing power with non-Islamic groups and turning their “brotherhood” kind of an organization into a modern political party. They have not given up formal support for sharia (except in Tunisia and Morocco) but are unable to define a concrete ruling program that would go beyond banning alcohol and promoting the veil or some other petty forms of shariatization.
After the Arab Spring, which started outside their ranks, the Islamists have choices to make. The first option would be the “Turkish model” (the AK Party): turning the “brotherhood” into a true modern political party, trying to rally a larger constituency than hard-core devout Muslims, recasting religious norms as more vague conservative values (family, property, work ethic, honesty), adopting a neoliberal approach to the economy, and endorsing a constitution, a parliament, and regular elections. Another option would be to ally with “counterrevolution” forces for fear of a real democracy that they are not sure to control, but they thereby risk losing their remaining legitimacy, as in Egypt, where they might be instrumentalized by the army. They may also side with the Salafis by calling for an Islamization that would center on certain isolated issues (veil, family law), the same way Christian conservatives in the West are focusing on abortion and gay marriage while ignoring other social and economic issues.
Whatever the political ups and downs, the diversity of the national cases, the foreseeable fragmentation of both “democrats” and “Islamists” into various trends and parties, the main issue will be to redefine the role of, and the reference to, Islam in politics. The de facto autonomization of the religious field from political and ideological control does not mean, once again, that secularism is necessarily gaining ground. What is at stake is the reformulation of religious reference in the public sphere. There is large agreement on inscribing in constitutions the “Muslim” identity of society and of the state; there is also large agreement on the fact that sharia is not an autonomous practical system of law that could be implemented from above and replace “secular” law.
As I’ve described, modern forms of religiosity tend to stress individual faith and choices over conformity to any sort of institutionalized Islam. The old motto “in Islam, no separation between religion (din) and worldly issues (dunya)” already turned a long time ago from an academic statement to mere wishful thinking, but it has been definitively undermined by the Arab Spring. What we see, more than secularization, is a deconstruction of Islam, torn between some sort of a cultural identity (there could be, in this sense, “atheist Muslims”), a faith that could be shared only by born-again believers (Salafis) in the confines of self-centered faith communities, or a “horizon of meaning” where references to sharia are more virtual than real.
The recasting of religious norms as values helps also to promote an interfaith coalition of religious conservatives that could unite around specific causes—opposition to same-sex marriage, for instance. It is interesting to see how, in Western Europe, for example, secular populists tend to stress more and more the Christian identity of Europe, while many Muslim conservatives try to forge an alliance of believers to defend shared values. In so doing, many of them tend to adopt an evangelical Protestant agenda, fighting abortion and Darwinism, both issues that have never been relevant in traditional Islamic debates. In this sense, modern neo-fundamentalists are trying to recast Islam as a kind of Western-compatible religious conservatism, a fact that is obvious in Turkey, where, in 2004, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, tried to promote an anti-adultery law that defined adultery not in terms of sharia but by reference to the modern Western family (a monogamous marriage of a man and a woman with equal rights and duties, thus making the custom of polygamy, not uncommon among traditional AK local cadres, although illegal since 1926, more clearly a crime). Islam is thus part of the recasting of a religious global market disconnected from local cultures.
Such an evolution is completely inconsistent with the image of Islam that is constructed and spread by populist movements in the West. In fact, as far as the West is concerned, the main legacy of 9/11, which will survive the “War on Terror” and the death of Bin Laden, is the rooting of Islamophobic populist movements in Western Europe and the United States. These movements have fully borrowed and legitimized the clashist theory: Islam is construed as the enemy of an otherwise elusive “Western” identity. Even populist movements born of a different set of grievances (Lega Nord in Italy, the Tea Party in the United States, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium) have endorsed Islamophobia as one of their main battle cries. It is no surprise that they all dismissed the Arab Spring as irrelevant and don’t acknowledge the way Muslims, both in their native societies and in the West, are recasting their faith into global forms of religiosity. Interestingly, the debate on Islam in the West raised the same questions as in the Middle East: Is religion first a faith or first an identity? Is the crucifix in Italian classrooms just a cultural symbol of national identity or the symbol of the sacrifice of Christ for sinners? The debate about the role of religion in the public sphere should be conducted beyond the clichés of Orientalist essentialism by acknowledging the transversal dimension that connects all the great world religions in their endeavor to find a balance between faith and identity, religion and culture, individual quest and collective belonging, and territorialization and globalization. In this sense, there is neither an Arab nor an Islamic exceptionalism.
Source: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/08/the-paradoxes-of-the-re-islamization-of-muslim-societies/

By Olivier Roy - Social Science Research Council Website- 8th of August 2011
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